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Introduction and Motivation
In many situations agents need to evaluate uncertain consequences of their actions. In order to compare different potential consequences agents need to assign likelihoods to these outcomes. How can individuals form (probabilistic) beliefs over outcomes?
Traditionally, economic theory models uncertainties in a state space representation a la Savage (1954) and Bayes and derive a subjective prior based on observable actions of the agent. This implicitly requires that an agent already posses a subjective prior belief, which is expressed by her observable actions. However, the Savage and Bayesian approach does not help an agent to find or form a prior explicitly, for instance by incorporating pieces of information directly into a belief formation. In particular in situations in which an agent might not be able to condense her insufficient or too complex information into a consistent state space, their normatively appealing and convincing approach to endogenously derive a belief is not feasible 1 .
We will consider such an environment and axiomatize a belief formation that allows to take directly into account the available information. This is strongly related to the aim of (asymptotic) statistical inference, where from data a distribution is derived. However in this paper we give a behavioral foundation for a belief formation in "non-asymptotic environments" that are characterized by heterogenous and limited information gathered in a list or database.
The impact of data and experience on the formation of a probabilistic belief was examined initially by the axiomatization of Billot et al. (2005) (BGSS from now on). The axiomatizations of BGSS and related ones of Eichberger and Guerdjikova (2010) (EG)
(for ambiguous multiprior beliefs) and Bleile (2014a) (B) (precision dependent cautious beliefs) yield that a belief induced by a database is a similarity weighted average of the estimations induced by all observed cases in the database 2 . Thereby similarity weights capture different degrees of relevance of the potentially very heterogenous information 3 .
A common shortcoming of these approaches is that an agent is obliged to take into consideration and account all past observations in her database. This precludes reasonable situations in which an agent might want to neglect, does miss or just forgets some pieces of information that would be in principle available. Our work relaxes this drawback of "compulsory" paying attention to all obtainable information. For this purpose we extend the mentioned axiomatic approaches (in particular BGSS) by adding a component of limited attention or consideration regarding available information.
A traditional and widely accepted assumption in economic theory is that gaining more information is beneficial and leads to improved actions. In this way, it is usually assumed that agents incorporate and take into account all available pieces of information 4 . However, the assumption of full attention and consideration of all available information requires that agents are aware of it, perceive it (unbiased) and eventually are able to process it without any cognitive and psychological constraints 5 .
The idea and concept of limited attention goes back to the seminal studies in psychology of Miller (1956) , in which he identified limited cognitive abilities in processing information as the source of incomplete consideration, especially deficits and constraints in parallel (simultaneous) processing of information. Since then, mounting evidence in psychology and marketing shows that agents process and restrict attention to only a small fraction of the overall available information and consistently fail to consider all potentially available information due to their limited attention span (e.g. Broadbent (1958) , Stigler (1961) , Pessemier (1978) , Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) , Chiang et al. (1998) ). Often agents employ (implicitly) a multistage process to assign different degrees of attention to specific pieces of information (Bettman (1979) ). In an initial rough filtering or screening stage agents pre-selects these elements that receive (or are worth to capture) full attention and consideration. In the literature this set of "surviving" elements is called a consideration set (Wright and Barbour (1977) , Bettmann (1979) , Roberts and Lattin (1991) ).
A formation of a consideration set might emerge for many reasons. Cognitive constraints in parallel processing of information and unawareness of the presence of information (due to complexity, size, sequential processing or search) might cause an unintentional filtering (Miller (1956) , Nedungadi (1990) , Schwartz (2004) ). The formation of a consideration sets as a (unintentionally) reply to avoid cognitive overload has been also studied in economic problems, e.g. recently Masatlioglu et al. (2012) axiomatized choices under (unintentional) limited attention.
In contrast, a consideration set can also be the result of a purposeful strategic elimination process. Agents often use (heuristic) filtering procedures to screen information rapidly and roughly before engaging into a costly and detailed evaluation (e.g. Wright and Barbour (1977) , Gensch (1987) , Nedungadi (1990) , Gigerenzer et al. (1999) , Hauser (2013) ). Usually, these heuristics are noncompensatory cutoff or satisficing rules that allow for an uncomplicated "effort-efficient" comparison. This approach has recently gained prominence in economics (in particular in decision theory), e.g. through the works of Lleras et al. (2010) and Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a,b) .
Another reason for the emergence of a consideration set relies on mounting evidence from psychology showing that often non-objective criteria like value systems, subjective motives or aversions, etc. restrict the attention of agents. Recent work has modeled these subjective and psychological biases ranging from overwhelming temptation (Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) In this paper, we want to incorporate the formation of a consideration set induced by limited attention (consideration) as an intermediate stage into a belief formation process.
In this way, our agent is not obliged to take into account all potentially available information, but might base her belief only on (survived) filtered information in the consideration set. In order to illustrate the basic idea and plausibility of such a two stage belief formation process we modify the doctor example of BGSS. 5 According to Simon (1959, p.272) perception and cognition intervene between subjective view and the objective real world. In this context perception is often referred to as a "filter", where filtering can not only be seen as a passive, but also as an active selection process involving exclusion of almost all that is not within the scope of attention.
A doctor needs to evaluate different outcomes of a treatment. She has some working experience or access to some medical database D = (c 1 , ..., c l ), where she recorded in a case c i = (x i , r i ) the vector of characteristic of a patient i, x i ∈ X (e.g. age, gender, weight, blood count), and the observable outcome of the treatment r i ∈ R (e.g. better, worse, adverse effects). A new patient characterized by x enters her office and using a medical record D, the doctor wants to derive a belief P x (D) ∈ ∆(R) over potential outcomes in R.
She might apply an empirical frequency and use only a part D x of the database D, which contains only cases c = (x, r c ) of patients with "identical" characteristic x compared to the current patient:
"Frequentist":
However, if the database contains not sufficiently many of these "identical" patients x,
she might want to include also "similar" patients. She judges the degree of similarity between patients x and x by s(x, x ) ∈ R + . Further, she might induce from a case c = (x c , r c ) not only a point estimate δ rc on the realized outcome, but derives a more general estimate P c ∈ ∆(R) on likelihoods of particular (related) outcomes and forms the belief as axiomatized in BGSS (2005) by:
"BGSS-belief":
However, if the database D is long, complex or retrieved partly from her memory, the doctor might not want or is just not able to (recall) pay attention to and take into account all potential cases in the database D. She filters out some observations contained in D with specific features Γ(D) ⊆ D. An intuitive example is a similarity satisficing procedure, in which she considers only sufficiently relevant cases that surpass a threshold of similarity
The filtered belief formation based on the similarity satisficing principle (under additional restrictions on the threshold value s * ) represents a special case of the general result we obtain in our representation theorem in Section 5.1.
Roughly, our filtered belief formation consist of two stages, in which initially a subjective (specific) filter process "selects" the information that builds the consideration set. In the second step, the agent forms her belief based on the remaining un-eliminated information in her consideration set.
One might be tempted to interpret such a filtered belief as the belief (1) of BGSS, based on an already (exogenously) ex-ante and independently filtered database Γ(D). However, such an separation of filtering and belief formation would exclude plausible and appealing filters based on similarities (as in (2)), since the similarity values are endogenously derived in the belief formation. Moreover, in our axiomatization both stages are merged by an axiom that focusses on the relationship between filtered databases and their induced beliefs.
The initial filtering process captures appealing and desirable psychological properties that are rooted in psychology and marketing literature. The main property is the well known and accepted consideration property. It is based on the idea and evidence, that if a case is considered in a database, i.e. is attention grabbing, then it should attract attention also in all of its sub-databases, since it faces less competition for attention by fewer pieces of information 6 . Further, we make some assumptions on the cognitive ability of agents and assume that an agent is able to pay attention to at least k (k ≥ 3)-many available different pieces of information. A slightly more demanding characteristics requires that order and frequency in which information appears in a databases does not affect the level of attention an agent attributes to it. Basically that means that pieces of information are per se attention grabbing and not due to their specific position or a sufficiently high number of appearance.
The second layer of a filtered belief formation concerns the axiomatization on the belief level. The normatively reasonable axioms follow the basic intuition of the axioms in BGSS, but are modified to capture the previous filtering stage. We generalize the Concatenation Axiom of BGSS in order to capture the previous filtering process on the involved databases. The original Concatenation Axiom says that a belief induced by a combination of two databases is formed as an average of the beliefs that are induced by each of these databases separately. We cannot directly translate this to filtered database, since concatenations of already filtered databases can differ enormously from the result of filtering the concatenation of the two underlying databases (before they were filtered) 7 . Thus, in order to ensure a reasonable averaging of the induced beliefs in the spirit of the axiom, we require consistent relationships between the involved filtered databases. Another (implicit enforced) axiom ensures that the order in which information appears is irrelevant for the belief it induces.
As a result, our filtered belief formation can be represented as a similarity weighted average of the estimates induced by each case that the agent actually pays attention to,
i.e. of those that survive the filtering. Hence the representation coincides with BGSS if the agent does not filter any information, but takes into account all available information.
Apart from the appealing intuition of filtering according to similarities (as in (2)), the filtering process can be any general arbitrary process that satisfies the required properties.
Various subjective and psychological motives, constraints, biases and justifications can be employed as elimination criteria 8 . In particular, many recently developed multi-criteria decision procedures include elimination procedures to (implicitly) form a consideration set.
The literature varies in the kind of criteria that are employed, e.g. using (compositions of) according to some exogenously given order or ranking (Salant and Rubinstein (2008) ).
Most of these approaches form consideration set in a way that can be interpreted as seeking for a reasons to select (based on Shafir et al. (1993) and Tversky (1972) and more related also in Lombardi (2009) and de Clippel and Eliaz (2012)).
Another approach to form a consideration set can be seen in a satisficing procedure (Simon (1959) and more related Tyson (2008 Tyson ( , 2013 , Papi (2012) , Manzini et al. (2013a) ).
The resulting consideration set contains only these elements which surpass a (endogenously) given threshold level according to some criteria. This is close to our motivating similarity satisficing example in (2).
However, for our purpose the most interesting paper is the axiomatic rationalization theory of Cherepanov et al. (2013) , since our assumed consideration property (of the filter) is a direct consequence of their normatively and descriptively appealing rationalization process. Modifying their justification procedure in order to cope with our other filter properties yields a corollary of our main representation result and allows for an interpretation in terms of a "rationalized" filtered belief.
The next section gives the general framework for the two stage filtered belief formation.
In Section 3 we introduce and discuss the properties on the filtering process. Section 4 deals with the axioms on the belief formation induced by a filtered database. The main representation theorem and a sketch of the proof is presented in Section 5 and we derive as a corollary the similarity satisficing belief process. The last section relates the filtering process to the recently developed multi-criteria/stage decision procedures. In particular we exemplarily modify the choice model of Cherepanov et al. (2013) to a filter process in our terms. An interpretation of the resulting representation in terms of multi-similarities is given. Section 7 concludes. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
The model
In this section, we introduce the case-based information framework and the basic building blocks of our belief formation based on filtered information. Further, we introduce some definitions and notations necessary for our approach.
Database framework
A basic case c = (x, r) consists of a description of the environment or problem x ∈ X and an outcome r ∈ R, where For a database D ∈ C * , f D (c) denotes the relative frequency of case c ∈ C in databases D.
The concatenation of two databases
and is defined by We need to translate some relations from sets to the list framework.
(ii) The ⊆-relation on the set of databases C * is defined by
for all c ∈ C. We will call such databases to be nested.
(iii) The ∩-relation on databases is given by The definitions are basically independent of the order of cases in the databases. Note however that the definition of ∩-relation in (iii) is very specific, since the order of C is transferred, i.e. by intersection a specific order (on C) is induced 9 .
Filter
In the literature so far, a filter on C * is usually defined as a set function Γ : 
Belief
For a finite set S, ∆(S) denotes the simplex of probability vectors over S and for n ∈ N ∆ n denotes the simplex over the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
In the axiomatizations of BGSS, EG and Bleile (2014a), an agent will form a belief over outcomes P (x, D) ∈ ∆(R) for a certain problem characterized by x ∈ X using her information captured in a database D ∈ C * , i.e. P : X × C * → ∆(R).
In the current approach a filtered belief is formed based only on parts of the information captured in D and that is filtered from the perspective of richer information E ∈ C * , i.e.
D ⊆ E (with slight abuse of notation). In this sense the filtered belief (
induced by a nested pair of databases D and E and can be interpreted as the belief over outcomes induced by database D ∈ C * seen through a filter that rests on perspective E (given problem x ∈ X). Hence, a filtered belief is a two stage process of filtering followed by a belief formation.
Technically, the filtered belief induced by the pair of nested databases D and E coincides with the BGSS belief based on an a priori already filtered database Γ E (D) 10 . However, as discussed in the introduction, a priori filtering would separate the filter procedure and the belief formation process that would exclude desirable applications based on endogenously derived similarity values, like the similar satisficing behavior (as discussed in our motivating example (equation 2)). Further, the nice axiomatization of BGSS based on relationships between filtered database and their induced beliefs would need to be defined on filtered databases as well, which merges both stages again. However, for our motivation and purpose the most intuitive (and desirable) filtered belief formation is based on a single database, i.e. the filtered belief (P • Γ)(x, D, D) induced by database D.
Throughout the paper the problem x is fixed, therefore x is often suppressed in the
Filter definition and properties
Instead of defining explicitly a procedure how to filter information we are more general and rather impose natural, well accepted and established properties in psychology and marketing. These properties are normatively and descriptively compelling in several situations and are indeed true for many heuristics people actually use in real life to screen their "information set". In particular many of the recently developed multistage decision models contain a wide variety of (endogenous and exogenous) filter procedures that satisfy our filter properties, which supports their relevance and generality (see Section 6) . In this sense, we can also interpret our filter as a choice correspondence in which elements surviving the pre-choice process form a consideration set of acceptable and relevant information. This (filtered) consideration set represents the underlying basis for a filtered belief formation process.
Basic Properties of a filter
In the last section, we mentioned briefly our concept of a generalized filter. More precisely:
Note that by definition Γ E (D) ⊆ D holds for all D ⊆ E, but it does not imply that
As mentioned already, the traditional definition of a filter considers only one database,
Our definition is based on two nested databases D ⊆ E for the filtering Γ E (D). Thereby, we want to capture the potential differences in filtering a database D 10 Basically meaning that (
depending on varying perspectives. Whether pieces of information receive attention might vary strongly with different perspectives of evaluations. However, our definition coincides with the usual traditional filter for any D = E ∈ C * , i.e. for a situation in which no additional information than database D is available in agents' minds.
We will discuss the three properties the definition proposes, namely the filtering, its specific content and induced ordering. will be further generalized by the following property.
Definition 3.2 Filter order invariance
Basically it states (in close relationship to BGSS Invariance Axiom for beliefs) that the order of the cases is immaterial for the resulting filtering of the cases, i.e. only the content of a database matters. Information should be attention grabbing per se and not due to its specific position in the database. From a first sight the property seems to be rather restrictive since agents appear to be able to consider all cases in the database "simultaneously" without any order biases, like first impressions and recency effect (see Rubinstein and Salant (2006)). However, if some of these effects are important, then they can be captured by a more elaborated description of the cases. For example, its description can include time or the order in which it was observed.
The filter order Invariance implies that in combination with the definition of intersections of databases
It implies the identity of beliefs induced by all possible combinations of reordered databases π(D) and π (E) that enter the filtering process.
A closely related property states and ensures quite naturally that if a case catches attention then all other cases of this type are attention grabbing as well.
Definition 3.3 Equal treatment of information
Basically, this means that all pieces of the same type are treated equally and either are attention grabbing or not.
Another content dependent property is similarly based on the view that attention or disregard is structural in a way that per se either a piece of information is eye-catching or attention grabbing or not. Namely, the filtering process is not affected by an (sufficiently large) amount of occurrence of a piece of information.
Definition 3.4 Filter ignorance of repeated information
A filter Γ satisfies the ignorance property if for all D ∈ C * it holds:
A repeated appearance of a case does not influence its perception in the sense that a case attracts attention if it is relevant or outstanding in itself and not because itself or another case appears in a specific amount. The assignment of attention to a case might be altered only if another new case appears or all appearances of a specific case are removed from the database (as induced by the consideration filter property defined below). In this sense, additional observation of already known and evaluated cases do not alter (already attached) attention levels.
The property finds support in Gul et al. (2012) , which examines the probabilities of choices when alternatives are duplicated. They propose, that duplicate alternatives should be identified as observational identically and should be (in a specific sense) irrelevant for the likelihoods with which an observational identical alternative is chosen. This can be related to a "pay attention"-choice in which we restrict the probabilities to pay attention to zero or one. However, duplication of evidence might affect the composition of a filtered consideration set in the list-framework of Rubinstein and Salant (2006) and hence violate our property (and their partition independence property). Of course, the number of times an element appears might have an influence on attention, for instance in a procedure that pays attention only to the most frequent element.
Main structural properties of a filter
The two following structural properties characterize the impact of nested databases on their induced filtered consideration set and the cognitive ability of an agent to process and pay attention to at least a minimum amount of available information.
Consideration property
The consideration property specifies the relationship between the induced consideration sets of nested databases in a quiet naturally way. It states, that if an agent pays attention to a case in a database, then also her attention is drawn to this case in all its sub-databases.
This follows the idea and evidence that elements in an information set compete for attention and need to outperform other pieces of information to be considered. If a case manages to attract attention or is salient enough in a database then it also gains attention in a sub-database, in which some of its rivals for attention are not anymore present. The classical example in marketing deals with the attention an agent assigns to products in a supermarket with a huge variety compared to a small neighborhood store. A specific jam catching your eye standing in front of a large supermarket shelf with fifty different jams will catch your attention also in the convenience store selling only five different sorts of jam.
Definition 3.5 Consideration property
From another point of view, if there is no reason (e.g. an (outstanding) piece of information)
in the larger sample E that shadows case c, i.e. c ∈ Γ(E), then it still cannot happen that case c is shadowed by any reason (e.g. any information) in the smaller sub-database.
Apart from the "competition for attention"-explanation the consideration property can be motivated by the finding that with increasing complexity and size of a set agents reduce the amount of alternatives they consider and also lower its intensity and seriousness 13 .
If the complexity of a database is caused by a difficult detailed evaluation of alternatives 13 See e.g. Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) and Shugan (1980) . involving compromising and tradeoffs, an agent might find it much harder to find reasons why to "choose" to consider a case. As a consequence agents might stick to only superficial analysis, where only the very important, salient or extraordinary alternatives receive attention. With decreasing complexity of a set agents might return to a more detailed analysis that facilitates the selection of more alternatives to be worth or justified to be included into the consideration set.
Minimal attention span
The following property describes the cognitive ability of an agent to handle and process information. Our minimal attention property requires that an agent considers in full detail at least k-many (k ≥ 3) available different pieces of information. More precisely, for all databases containing less than k many different information an agent takes into account all pieces of information. For more complex databases an agent is free to apply filtering techniques to process her information and neglects some pieces of information, as long as she pays attention to at least k-many different pieces of information.
Definition 3.6 Minimal attention span
A filter is minimal attentive with k ≥ 3, if for all D ∈ C * such that
From this perspective, the property induces that agents are cognitively sophisticated enough to handle at least k-many different pieces of information completely and with full attention. Also, agents might want to gather a certain minimal amount of information to evaluate and act in an informed and confident way. Thus they take into account all available information, when only few (less than k different) information is around 14 .
The property combines basically two components -minimum required amount of information and filtering in case of potential information overload -which are well supported by empirical findings. We state it in terms of a general minimal attention span k, but for our purpose k = 3 is sufficient and also meets empirical evidence. For example Gensch (1987) found that screening and filtering rules may be invoked for as few as four alternatives, but agents consider and rely on all information for less diverse information sets. In the marketing literature Jarvis and Wilcox (1977) examined the usual size of consideration sets and discovered that the average size of consideration sets is three to eight products, independent of the size of the initial information set 15 .
So far a minimal attention property is usually not assumed in the (choice) literature in which usually no lower limit is given for the filtering stage unless a non-emptiness condition. In a special case of Lleras et al. (2010) agents have no limited attention problem for situations of binary alternative set, i.e. their agents are always able to pay attention to both alternatives 16 . However, their version does not cover any restrictions for more general situations, as specified in our property.
14 One can also think about it as in Simon (1959, p.263) based on an aspiration or satisfaction level such that at least k cases are attracting interest or attention. If not, the level was too high and a reduction of the level leads to some search behavior of the agent to pay attention to more available alternatives. 15 Miller' s insight (1956) that agents can process or remember at least seven case is also covered here. 16 See also Masatlioglu et al. (2012) , where Γ(D) ≥ 2 allows the full revelation of preferences
The requirement of filtering a minimum amount of information constitutes a strong constraint to identify filters as choice correspondences. We will discuss this problematic issue in Section 6, where we interpret filtering in a choice theoretic perspective.
Definition 3.7 Admissible Filter
A filter Γ on C * × C * is called an admissible filter if it satisfies the invariance, equal treatment, ignorance, consideration and minimal attention span property.
The Axioms
In this section we introduce the axioms on the stage of belief formation.
Implied Filter Invariance Axiom
As mentioned in the section before, a natural axiom for a belief process that is already implied by the definition of intersections and the filter properties, is a version of an Invariance Axiom as in BGSS for filtered databases that reads:
Filtered Invariance Axiom (already implied)
C T and for every permutation π : {1, ..., T } → {1, ..., T } and any filter Γ E (D), where
.., c π(T ) ) the following holds:
Basically it says that an induced belief over outcomes depends only on the content of a filtered database and is insensitive to the sequence and order in which data arrives.
However, by our definitions of a filter any filtered databases containing the same content have exactly the same specific ordering (according to the order on C), which makes the invariance property superfluous, since re-orderings do not occur after filtering (see equation (3)). In this sense the filtered Invariance Axiom is indirectly substituted by the definition of a filter and the filter ignorance property 17 .
Per se the invariance property does not allow for different impacts whether a case appears earlier or later. However the order in which information is provided or obtained can influence the judgment strongly and may carry information by itself. One way to cope with these order effects is to describe the cases informative enough. E.g. if one wants to capture the position or time of occurrence of a case in the filtered database, one could implement this information into the description of the cases itself. Put differently, if one challenges the consequences of an invariance property, then there must be some criteria which distinguish the cases and taking into account these differences explicitly in the description of the cases, may lead the agent to reconcile with such an invariance.
Filtered Concatenation Axiom
such that:
where λ = 0 if and only if Γ F (D) = ∅.
In the following we will call the database which emerges from concatenation of other databases as the combined or concatenated database, whereas the databases used for the concatenation will be called combining or concatenating databases.
The filtered Concatenation Axiom says that a filtered belief induced by a concatenated database is a weighted average of the filtered beliefs induced by their respective combining databases. The axiom captures the idea that the belief based on the combination of two databases cannot lie outside the interval spanned by the beliefs induced by each combining database separately. Intuitively it can be interpreted in the following way (stated from an exclusion point of view): if the information in any database induces an agent's belief not to exclude an outcome r, then the outcome r cannot be excluded by the belief induced by the combination of all these databases 18 . Alternatively, if a certain conclusion is reached given two filtered databases, the same conclusion should be reached given their filtered union.
However, in order to sustain the normative appealing interpretation of averaging (filtered) beliefs, the filtered concatenation of two databases must coincide with the concatenation of these two filtered databases. This is achieved by employing the common perspective F ⊇ D • E according to which all involved databases are filtered, i.e. Γ F .
Otherwise it would not be in general reasonable to require the existence of such an average of beliefs, since the elements surviving the filtering process for each single database might differ from the elements surviving the elimination of the database generated by the combination of the two 19 . In this situation, it would be implausible and unreasonable to determine a relationship between the induced filtered beliefs. The required structure ensures that a filtered belief induced by the concatenated database relies on information that is also employed in the filtered beliefs induced by the single concatenating databases and thus allows for an interwoven filtering and belief formation.
Moreover, another important reason for requiring this specific common perspective is based on the motivation that an agent should filter from the perspective of the richest information available, which is at least the concatenated database D•E, i.e. F ⊇ D•E. This is very reasonable and natural, since the agent processed already at least the information in the concatenated database due to the fact that she actually wants to form a (filtered) belief based on this filtered database. In this way she cannot remove (intentionally) some (gained or experienced) information for filtering the concatenating database from a less in- 18 Of course the axiom is stronger in the sense that it not only requires that the probability of such an r is positive, but it should lie between the minimal and maximal assigned probabilities induced by the combining (filtered) databases. 19 In an unfiltered concatenated database any information appear in either of their (unfiltered) concatenating databases and find weight in their induced beliefs. However for filtered databases formative perspective 20 . In this way, the concatenated databases represent a quite natural choice as a "smallest" perspective from which the filtering process is initiated.
Collinearity Axiom
No three elements of {(P • Γ c (c)} c∈C are collinear.
Technically speaking this axiom allows to derive a unique similarity function (in combination with the other axioms), but it has also some reasonable intuition. Roughly it states that the estimation based on a case is never equivalent to the combined estimations based on two other cases. Hence, a case is always informative in the sense that no combination of two other cases can deliver the same estimate and would make this case redundant.
Representation Theorem
Theorem 5.1
Let there be given a function (P • Γ) : C * × C * → ∆(R), where P : C * → ∆(R) and Γ be an admissible filter on C * × C * . Let (P • Γ) : C * × C * → ∆(R) satisfy the Collinearity Axiom.
Then the following are equivalent:
(i) The function (P • Γ) satisfies the filtered Concatenation Axiom
(ii) There exists for each c ∈ C a unique P c ∈ ∆(R), and a unique -up to multiplication by a strictly positive number-function s :
Rough sketch of the proof
The necessity part is straightforward calculation. The sufficiency part follows the rough structure of the proof of BGSS and Bleile (2014a), but differs in the crucial arguments.
The idea is to transform the framework from the space of databases to the space of frequency vectors that is structural more tractable, i.e. the filtered belief based on databases
. In order to show that this is viable we exploit some properties of the filter and the Concatenation Axiom.
The essential part of the proof is to derive the similarity weights (s i ) i≤m . This will be shown inductively over |C| = m and div(f E ) ≤ m.
Step 1: Base case for the induction, i.e. |C| = m = 3 and div(f E ) ≤ 3, w.l.o.g. C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }, i.e. aim to find s 1 , s 2 , s 3 .
For pairs (f D , f E ) ∈ ∆ × ∆ (i.e. such that div(f E ) ≤ 3) the properties of the filter (in particular the minimal attention span) induce that the filtering stage disappears and the axioms coincide with BGSS. Thus, the same steps (using simplicial partitions) as in BGSS will show the above representation for all pairs (
Step 2: |C| = m > 3 and div(f E ) ≤ m.
As in BGSS, we can show (again using the minimal attention property) that the similarity weights derived in Step 1 for any set of basic cases C = {c i , c j , c k } are independent of the triplet {i, j, k} and thus we can define for all
using the derived s = (s 1 , .., s m ) The aim is to show (
) is used to exploit the induction assumption. 
Interpretation of Theorem
The main difference to the axiomatized representation of BGSS (i.e. (1)) lies obviously in the inclusion of the filtering process that captured by the indicator function in the representation (4). Thereby the agent only employs and needs to take into account the information that she really filtered to be most important, "relevant" or acceptable (according to some criteria, such that the admissible filter properties are met) 21 . Thus, the belief formation follows a two-stage procedure of filtering and subsequent belief formation.
Another deviation from BGSS concerns the dependence of the axiomatization on pairs of databases and no single database as in BGSS. Such a structure is necessary and reasonable for our axiomatization. However for interpretational purpose and the motivation behind this work, the situation E = D is most interesting. In this context, an agent is not concerned with additional information or priming of her mind by E, but evaluates the given or evoked database D. By interpreting a database D as her potentially available memory, an agent might recall or retrieve only some of her memorized experiences Γ(D). Basically Γ(D) can be seen as the result of a brainstorming or coming to mind process of those past experiences that she deems most appropriate, valuable, salient or wants to take into account.
Example: Similarity Satisficing
Initially Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1957 introduced satisficing behavior as an alternative approach to the classical rational choice theory. According to him, in most global models of rational choice all alternatives are evaluated before a choice is made, but " in actual human decision-making alternatives are often examined sequentially. We may, or may not, know the mechanism that determines the order of procedure. When alternatives are examined sequentially, we may regard the first satisfactory alternative that is evaluated as such as the one actually selected" (Simon (1955) In our motivating example of a similarity satisficing procedure (2), the filtered belief was
.
Its interpretation is especially appealing if a database is identified with recalled memory
and assuming that those experiences are retrieved earlier that are most similar to the current problem. In this situation an agent will stop to contemplate after some time and starts to process the till-then recalled (most relevant) information.
Obviously, setting the threshold level to zero, i.e. s * = 0, would result in the BGSS representation (1). This directly shows that s * needs to be restricted in order to be meaningful embedded in our filtered belief formation-framework. In particular, our filtering process must satisfy the minimal attention and consideration property. The former property requires that we need to take into consideration the k (k ≥ 3) most similar cases. This determines the threshold values s * . Obviously, such a threshold needs to be database-dependent, i.e. s * (E) =: s E for all E ∈ C * . More precisely, define for all E ∈ C * S E := {(s(c)) c∈E } and denote by s E j the j-largest number s(c) according to ≥ in S E . Then we get directly that for all E ∈ C * the database-dependent threshold level s E is given by Summarized, this yields the following Corollary.
Corollary 5.1
Let P be as in Theorem 5.1 and Γ a similarity satisficing filter Γ E (D) := (c ∈ D|s(c) ≥ s E )
for D ⊆ E ∈ C * with database dependent similarity thresholds s E as defined above. Then the equivalence in Theorem 5.1 holds with the specific representation
A database dependent threshold is even more in the spirit of Simon's satisficing behavior. Simons hypothesis is that most subjects search sequentially and stop search when an environmentally determined level of reservation utility (similarity in this context) has been surpassed. Hence, for the specification of their reservation or satisficing level individuals take into account the environment, i.e. in our setup the given information set E.
In addition, Simon proposed that the levels of reservation utility (similarity here) increase with set size and object complexity, i.e. for larger databases in our setup. Thus, both conditions on the threshold -database dependence and increasing in database complexity -are well-grounded in the satisficing literature.
A recent related paper that is concerned with the axiomatization of a two- The aim of this section is to interpret and identify our filter in terms of a multi-criteria choice correspondence by adopting the above mentioned multistage elimination procedures.
A problematic issue in merging both concepts lies in the fact that choice models usually are intended to identify a single chosen alternative by choosing in the final step the "best" alternative within the remaining consideration set. However, for a filtering process and implied corresponding consideration sets singletons are not desirable. For this reason we do not identify and compare the entire choice process with a filtering process, but we are mainly interested in the filtering and elimination stages and not on the final choice stage.
On the other hand we can stick to these choice models, if we replace the criteria applied in the final choice step (often binary asymmetric relation) by appropriate satisficing criteria (as discussed above) such that we end up with a set of acceptable alternatives. Roughly speaking, we discuss and relate the models in a more approximative and intuitive style, being aware of the difficulties and basic differences.
Filter as choice correspondence in multistage procedures
In order to identify a filter Γ as a choice correspondence we need to discuss our filter properties in a multistage decision theoretic framework.
The Since usual decision theoretic frameworks deal with sets of alternatives in which orderings and repetitions are immaterial, the properties of invariance, equal treatment and ignorance of additional identical information are directly satisfied for a choice correspondence.
Our minimal attention span property can be interpreted as a restriction to multiple choices (i.e. correspondences) such that a minimum of k available cases need to be chosen.
Of course this requirement differs from common decision theoretic frameworks in which no restrictions on the quantity of chosen elements is enforced (unless non-emptiness). Thus, it will be crucial to implement this property into an adopted choice correspondence. A possible approach will be proposed and discussed in Section 6.2. In particular we exemplarily adopt CFS's rationalization model, but the taken approach can be applied to other models as well (discussed below). Another approach to guarantee for a minimum amount of choices can be imposed by enforcing an appropriate satisficing strategy at some stage of the choice process.
However, for the moment we want to focus on the Consideration property. In contrast, our consideration property does not rely on such an unawareness component and in general both properties (attention and consideration) are independent (see Lleras, et al. (2010) for an example demonstrating the differences).
Models with explicit formation procedures
Given a binary relation R on C, we denote by U (D, R) := (c ∈ D | ∃c withcRc) 22 
Sequential elimination Procedures
The following approaches adopt the same rough idea of "short-listing" in which multicriteria are checked sequentially and only those alternatives survive until the final consideration stage that meet some or all criteria. The elimination is based mainly on undominance inspections regarding the specific criterion. 
)).
In a similar spirit Horan (2013) summarizes many of these two stage models in which a consideration stage is formed according to undominance based on a asymmetric relation and then a second (asymmetric) relation is used for the choice.
Obviously, all such short-listing procedures (and extended to more criteria (R i ) i ) do satisfy the consideration property.
A sequential elimination procedure of a different kind is discussed in Manzini and Mariotti (2012b). Their consideration set is formed according to a (asymmetric, possibly 22 For our purpose it might make more sense to think rather in terms of satisficing than maximal elements, e.g. in the sense of U (Ri, D) = (c ∈ D|cRic * i ) for some threshold case c * i .
incomplete) relation P on subsets that are interpreted as categories. The un-dominated categories survive the elimination phase.
Γ(D) = (S ⊂ D | ∃S ⊂ D such thatSP S).
In order to capture the consideration property, specific requirements on the categorization structure are necessary. Bleile (2014b) implements two potential versions of categorizations on databases into a belief formation process.
Satisficing procedures
The following branch of literature adopts the satisficing idea of Simon (1955 Simon ( , 1957 ). Obviously, for a general unspecified frame our filter properties are not directly satisfied.
Reason Based Choice procedures
In general, the above mentioned procedures to form a consideration set can be interpreted under the premise of having and/or seeking a reason to accept or eliminate alternatives.
This general idea follows the stream of literature on reason based choice initiated by Shafir et al. (1993) or even Tversky (1972) . That is, elements in the consideration set are those that can be (internally) justified most easily (according to some reasons). Thereby as above, an (un)dominance structure (according to one, some or all criteria) serves as convincing reason for choosing the specific element. A link between reason based choice and the consideration property can be established by the insight that in a smaller set it might be easier to find a reason to choose some alternative, whereas in a larger set it also might be easier to find a reason to reject.
Lombardi (2009) Similarly, in the vein of seeking reasons to justify the selection, De Clippel and Eliaz (2012) employ a pro-cons bargaining procedure based on linear orders P 1 , P 2 . The agent forms the consideration set via (internal) compromising between P 1 and P 2 by trying to receive as many as possible dominated alternatives for both rationales.
The consideration property needs not to hold in general for this procedure.
However, the most interesting and elegantly fitting model for our approach is CFS's (2013) Rationalization Theory that we want to merge with our approach exemplarily.
Rationalization Theory and related psychological filter
CFS model a consideration filter explicitly as a rationalization procedure. For a set of general binary relations R = (R 1 , ..., R n ) a case in database D is rationalized if cR ic for allc ∈ D for some i ≤ n. This psychological filter contains those alternatives that are 23 In general, the psychological literature (e.g. Andrews and Srinivasan (1995) , Roberts and Lattin (1997) ) states that the criteria influencing consideration and the final evaluation stage may differ as well as (partially) overlap. Overlapping criteria, however, play different roles at both stages. 24 Note, there is a difference to undomination justifiable by at least one criterium, rational, reason, story, etc.
This procedure is very interesting, since such a psychological filter satisfies the consideration property directly and hence the rationalization procedure can be seen as a generator of any filter satisfying the consideration property. However, for our purpose we need to take care of our additional minimal attention property. Roughly speaking, we want to find some reasonable rationales S = (S 1 , ..., S N ) that deliver an admissible filter via a rationalization procedure similar to CFS.
For a binary relations S and for D ∈ C * , we define the following recursive (maximal) domination sets for an attention level k ≥ 3
Note, that M ax * (D, S) can be empty, e.g. for div(D) < k. Basically the modification of a CFS filter serves the reason to capture the required minimal attention property by enforcing ad hoc that always the k-best cases according to a most important, seminal, distinguishing, leading rational (criterium, reason, story) S 1 are consider for sure. In addition, if they differ from the best cases according to the other criteria, also all cases which are rationalizable by these other rationales survive the elimination procedure. A plausible way to justify such a formation process would emphasize the extraordinary role of criterion S 1 . An agent is focussing on the (at least) k-best undominated or most salient alternatives for the most important criterion S 1 and only the best alternatives according to the minor, rather marginal or negligible criteria are worth to consider. For instance, an agent buying a car would choose according to different criteria, like speed, mileage, gas consumption, etc. Her major criteria might be gas consumption and hence includes the k best cars regarding economy into her consideration set, whereas she only takes the fastest car and that with lowest mileage into account, since they are outstanding or salient within the minor criteria.
For the definition and the underlying recursive domination we have in mind k = 3.
For larger minimal attentions k one can generalize this approach to any specific structure of ranking criteria. For instance for k = 4, one might assume to consider for sure the two best alternatives according to rational S 1 , and additional the two best remaining alternatives regarding to story S 2 . In this sense a minimal attentive psychological filter can be generalized in arbitrary ways for specific attention levels.
The non-emptiness requirement of a MAR-filter, i.e. M ax * (D, S 1 ) = ∅, is for example satisfied if the binary relation S 1 is complete. But also for an incomplete "benchmark" or satisficing relation S 1 25 the non-emptiness is satisfied if c * is chosen such that there exist at least k cases c ∈ D such that cS 1 c * Consequently, we can state the following corollary Corollary 6.1
Let Γ be an M AR-filter on C * × C * based on a set of binary relations S = {S 1 , ..., S N }.
Then Γ is an admissible filter and the equivalence in the Theorem 5.1 holds for all D ⊆ E ∈ C * , such that Γ E (D) = ∅ with the specific representation
In general, most of the above mentioned multistage procedures can be adopted to satisfy the minimal attention property by replacing an usual dominance structure by our defined M ax * structure for some rational at some stage of their elimination procedures. In this way, these modified multistage choice processes (that satisfy the consideration property)
can be interpreted as an admissible filter and incorporated into our filtered belief formation.
An appealing and intuitive example for rationales S i in S is to interpret them as rationales that are related to componentwise similarities on the characteristics space X = 
(ii) "Benchmark exceeding componentwise similarity": For all i ≤ N the asymmetric, transitive and possibly incomplete binary relation S * i is defined by cS * ic if and only if
Obviously, the binary relation defined in (i) can be used to define a MAR-filter. The relations in (ii) can be applicable for a MAR-filter if for any D ∈ C * s * 1 is chosen according to s * 1 ≤ s
(as defined in Section 5.1).
Conclusion
This paper examines how beliefs are formed by agents that are constraint or not willing to pay attention to all potentially available pieces of information. It is well known in the psychology and marketing literature that humans do not take into account all available information due to many different reasons. Based on this insight we axiomatize a two stage belief formation procedure in which agents employ only these pieces of information that "survived" a first step of (un(intentional)) filtering (or screening). The filter is required An intuitive and natural application of a filtered belief formation are models of satisficing behavior regarding the relevance or appropriateness of information for the current problem. Moreover, it captures also a conditional belief formation process that only takes into account identical problems in the past and neglects all not perfectly similar observations -which cannot be covered by BGSS, EG and Bleile (2014a).
In particular interesting is that filtering (and elimination) of information (or alternatives) emerged very recently as a research topic in the decision theory literature. These multi-stage/criteria models incorporate as well a first step of filtering before engaging into the final choice step. Many of these models can be easily translated and embedded into the filtering stage of our belief formation process such that our filter stage can be interpreted as a choice correspondence in terms of decision theory.
A Proof of Theorem 5.1, necessity part (ii) ⇒ (i)
Thus, the the filtered Concatenation Axiom is satisfied. .
B Proof of Theorem 5.1, sufficiency part (i) ⇒ (ii) B.1 Important Observations
In the proof, we treat the situation in which the level of minimal attention k is set equal to three, i.e. k = 3. This simplifies notational effort and is sufficient to follow the main steps of the proof that analogously work for any k ≥ 3.
The following Lemma states useful and crucial properties for the proof.
Lemma B.1 Let Γ be an admissible filter, then the following holds:
we have some kind of idempotence, i.e.
Γ(Γ
Proof: (i) By definition Γ D (c) ⊆ c, hence the equal treatment property delivers directly the desired result.
(ii) By definition and the equal treatment property, we have for all
, then by minimal attention property div(Γ(E)) = k and thus by the equal treatment property Γ(E) =
(iii) By definition of a filter, we have
and hence the claim holds true.
Basically (ii) just says that no filtering of D takes place in this situation (only a reordering takes place, which is "immaterial" for the induced belief).
B.2 Translating the database framework to frequencies
An essential step in the proof is to identify databases with their frequency vectors. The space of frequency vectors is more tractable and enables us to adopt the structure of BGSS's proof (and use the procedure of of Bleile (2014a) ). However, the proof here requires some additional features, since in addition filters are involved, which alters the crucial steps in the inductive proof.
B.2.1 General Definitions for a Frequency Framework
We need to introduce some definitions regarding the frequency framework.
The set of all frequency vectors on the ordered set of basic cases C = {c 1 , .., c m } is given by (since C is fixed we skip it in the following) ∆(C) = ∆ := {f = (f 1 , ..., f m ) s. th. f i ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] for all i ≤ m and i≤m f i = 1} The following set represents all frequency vectors related to databases D ∈ C T :
e. the frequency vector f D represents all databases D Z for some Z ∈ N and we cannot relate it to any specific database D k for a specific k ∈ N. (ii) Let d ∈ ∆ T and e ∈ ∆ L , then the ∩-relation on ∆ × ∆ is defined by
For definition (i) we have in mind that there exist T and L such that d represents a database of length T, i.e. D ∈ C T and e an E ∈ C L such that min j≤m d j T ≤ min j≤m e j L.
B.2.2 Why is a transformation viable?
Roughly, we want to show that for a filtered belief formation we can identify databases D ⊆ E ∈ C * in the filtering process by frequencies
. For this purpose, we exploit the properties of an admissible filter and the axioms on filtered belief formation in the following way.
(i) The filter ignorance property for Γ implies directly
However, since for all
Further, by the definition of a filter and its order invariance property (and hence its implied belief invariance property) the order of the cases do not matter, which enables us to represent all involved databases by their frequency vector on C (which are independent of lengths) and their corresponding lengths. However, by the above observations, within the filtered belief formation, lengths of databases become irrelevant in the sense of equation (6) . In particular, since each D Z ∈ C * (for any Z ∈ N) is represented by the same frequency vector f D , the "sufficiently large"-condition looses its bite. Thus, we can identify the filtered belief formation process on databases by frequency vectors.
Filtered belief induced by frequencies Definition B.3
The filtered beliefs (P • Γ) : C * × C * → ∆(R) based on databases D ⊆ E translates to corresponding beliefs based on frequency vectors d ⊆ e in the following way:
Basically, the weakening of the condition D ⊆ E to f D ⊆ f E runs through the implicit or intuitive interpretation of Γ f E (f D ) in a way such that there exists an appropriate replication Z of database E (i.e. (ii) Minimal attention span:
(iii) Filter ignorance of repeated information:
p+1 , ..,
The equal treatment property is directly satisfied by the definition of a filter in frequency terms.
Definition B.6
A filter Γ on ∆ × ∆ → ∆ satisfying the consideration, equal treatment, minimal attention span and ignorance property is called admissible.
Analogously to Lemma B.1, we get in frequency terms:
B.2.4 Axioms in frequency terms
Filtered Concatenation Axiom Let Γ be a filter on ∆ × ∆. For all d ∈ ∆ T and e ∈ ∆ L for any T, L ∈ N, there exists λ ∈ [0, 1], such that for g ⊇ f : Then, there exist unique probability vectors (P j ) j≤m ∈ ∆(R), and unique -up to multiplication by a strictly positive number-strictly positive numbers (s j ) j≤m ∈ R such that for all
where Γ f j (q) denotes the frequency of case c j in Γ f (q).
B.3 Proof: Sufficiency part of Theorem 5.1 in frequency terms
We have by Lemma B.2 (ii) directly that Γ f (q j ) = q j for all f ⊇ q j such that div(f ) ≤ 3 and hence we need to choose
The aim of the inductive proof over m with |C| = m or div(f ) ≤ m is to find the similarity values s 1 , ..., s m .
Step 1:
Step 1.1: Defining similarity weights We define q * := 1 3 (q 1 + q 2 + q 3 ) and for f ⊇ q * Lemma B.2 (ii) yields
According to the filtered Concatenation Axiom there exist λ ∈ int(∆ 3 ) (by minimal attention, i.e. Γ f (q j ) = q j ) such that
where the last equality follows from (8) .
By equating both representations we can derive the corresponding similarity weights s 1 , s 2 , s 3 uniquely up to multiplication by a strictly positive number and define for all q ⊆ f ∈ ∆
The aim is now to show that for all (q, f ) ∈ ∆ × ∆ such that q ⊆ f
All such (q,f) are collected in
Step 1.2: All simplicial points (with appropriate perspective) satisfy equation (9) Notation: In the following we will denote for a, b ∈ ∆ or a, b ∈ ∆(R) the straight line through a and b by (a, b) (since there won't be a confusion to the usual interval notation).
The main tool of the proof is the following observation, which will be recursively applied in an appropriate manner in the proof.
are not collinear, then (e, g) ∈ E for g ∈ ∆ such that div(g) ≤ 3 and e, f ⊆ g for all f ∈ {a, b, c, d}.
Proof:
W.l.o.g. let e be between a and b on the line through a and b. By the filtered Concatenation Axiom we get
since (P • Γ) s and (P • Γ) satisfy the axiom. For f ∈ {a, b} such that div(f ) ≤ 3, Lemma B.2 (ii) generalizes it to
for all g ∈ ∆ such that div(g) ≤ 3 and e, f ⊆ g. Analogously, we get a similar result for the segment (c, d). By Lemma B.2 we know that Γ g (f ) = Γ f (f ) for all f ∈ {a, b, c, d} and since by assumption
Since the intersection of the two line is unique due to the Collinearity Axiom, we get the desired result, i.e. (P • Γ g )(e) = (P • Γ g ) s (e) and (e, g) ∈ E. . By Lemma B.2 we know that Γ f (q) = q for any q ⊆ f such that div(f ) ≤ 3, hence we need to show equality (9) not for all appropriate pairs (q, f ), but only for any q and some appropriate f such that q ⊆ f . Then it will hold for all f such that q ⊆ f .
In the following, we will partition the simplex ∆ into so called simplicial triangles re-cursively, as illustrated in the Figure 1 below.
Definition of Simplicial Triangles:
The 0-th simplicial partition consist of vertices q j 0 ∈ ∆, which are exactly the unit vectors q j for j = 1, 2, 3. The first simplicial partition of ∆ is a partition to four triangles separated by the segments connecting the middle points between the two of the three unit frequency vectors, i.e. q 1 1 := ( We want to show that all simplicial points satisfy equation (9) , i.e. are in E, by induction over the l-th simplicial partitions. Step 1.1. showed the claim for l = 0 (equation (10) ).
We proceed to the points in the First simplicial partition: Since q 1 1 = (q 1 , q 2 ) ∩ (q 3 , q * ), and we already know that for all f ∈ {q 1 , q 2 , q 3 , q * } (f, f ) ∈ E we can apply Lemma B.3 if the collinearity condition holds. However, since (P • Γ q i )(q i ) = P i for i = 1, 2, 3 and (P • Γ q * )(q * ) ∈ int(conv({P 1 , P 2 , P 3 })) the Collinearity Axiom directly induces the noncollinearity condition. Hence, by Lemma B.3 we get that (q 1 1 , f ) ∈ E for all f such that q 1 1 ⊆ f .
With the same reasoning, we get (q 2 1 , f ), (q 3 1 , f ) ∈ E where f ⊇ q 2 1 (respectively q 3 1 ). Thus all pairs (q i 1 , f ) consisting of a simplicial points of the first simplicial partition and all f such that q j 1 ⊆ f are included in E.
For the second simplicial partition we distinguish between inner simplicial points and points on the boundary of the simplex ∆, i.e. between two of the corners q j . Figure 2 demonstrates the intuition.
(a) The first step involves the inner simplicial points q 4 2 , q 5 2 , q 7 2 ∈ int(conv({q 1 , q 2 , q 3 })).
Since q Step from 1st to 2nd Simplicial partition and for all f ∈ {q 1 1 , q 3 1 , q 1 , q 2 1 } (f, f ) ∈ E by Step 1.1 and Step 1.2 for the first simplicial partition, we need to check the collinearity condition to apply Lemma B.3. However, the condition is met since the induced beliefs for (q j 1 , q j 1 ) with j = 1, 2, 3 are in int(conv({P 1 , P j })) that cannot lie on one line since (P j ) j≤3 are not collinear by the Collinearity Axiom. Consequently by Lemma B.3 we get that (q 4 2 , f ) ∈ E for all f ⊇ q 4 2 . Analogously, we can get that all simplicial points (combined with appropriate perspective f) of the 2nd partition in the interior of ∆, i.e. q 5 2 , q 7 2 with appropriate super-frequencies f are in E.
(b) In the second step we will deal with and focus on the simplicial points on the boundary of ∆ (e.g. representative q 9 2 , see Figure 2 ).
We have that q 9 2 ∈ (q 3 , q 2 ) ∩ (q 4 2 , q 7 2 ). All frequencies f involved in the intersection are shown (Step 1.1. and Step 1.2 (a) for second partition) to be contained in E, in the sense of (f, f ) ∈ E. Again, the non-collinearity is fulfilled since (P 2 and P 3 ) and induced beliefs in int(conv({P 1 , P 2 , P 3 })) are involved and (P 2 , P 3 ) ∈ int(conv({P 1 , P 2 , P 3 })) since (P j ) j≤3 are not collinear. Thus, Lemma B.3 delivers (q 9 2 , f ) ∈ E for all f ⊇ q 3 2 . The same procedure with analogous and adjusted arguments yield that all simplicial points on the boundary of the 2nd simplicial partition combined with appropriate superfrequencies (perspectives) are also included in E.
The same kind of algorithm works for all simplicial points of any l-th simplicial partitions, i.e. obviously each q ∈ rim(conv({q 1 , q 2 , q 3 })) is for some l captured. For q ∈ int(conv({q 1 , q 2 , q 3 })) one can approximate q via a series of simplicial points (q 1 l , q 2 l , q 3 l ) such that q ∈ int(conv({q 1 l , q 2 l , q 3 l } l )) for all l. In detail, the completion for all permissible (q, f ) ∈ ∆ × ∆ can be shown almost similarly as in Step 1.3 Bleile (2014a) (or differently in BGSS Step 1.2 in their proof) and hence we refer to these papers for the entire procedure. This concludes the proof for the case |C| = 3 or (q, f ) with q ⊆ f such that div(f ) ≤ 3. Now we need to show the claim for |C| = m > 3 or div(f ) ≤ m.
Step 2: |C| = m > 3
Step 2.1: Defining the similarity weights Using the considerations from Step 1 above for {j, k, l} (i.e. q * {j,k,l} := i∈{j,k,l} q i , q i ∈ ∆ and q ⊆ f ∈ ∆(q j , q k , q l )) we can derive the similarity weights (s {j,k,l} i ) i∈{j,k,l} . Further, for all (q,f) such that q ⊆ f ∈ conv({q j , q k , q l }) the following representation holds Moreover for all i ∈ {j, k, l}, we have (P • Γ f ) {j,k,l} (q i )) = P i and (s {j,k,l} i ) i∈{j,k,l} are unique up to multiplication by a positive number. Similar to BGSS or Bleile (2014a), we can show that the similarity values s {j,k,l} i are independent of the choice of j, k and l for all i ∈ {j, k, l}, since filtering is not present in the arguments. Thus we can define for all q ⊆ f ∈ ∆ (P • Γ f ) s (q) :
The aim is to show that for all (q, f ) ∈ ∆ × ∆ such that q ⊆ f (P • Γ f )(q) = (P • Γ f )(q).
Step 2.2: Completion to all (q, f ) ∈ ∆ × ∆ By
Step 1 we know that the claim (P • Γ f ) s (q) = (P • Γ f )(q) is true for all (q, f ) such that div(f ) ≤ 3. We take this as the base case of our induction.
For the induction assumption, we have that (P •Γ f ) s (q) = (P •Γ f )(q) for all (q, f ) ∈ ∆×∆ with q ⊆ f and div(f ) ≤ k − 1. The induction step considers q, f ∈ ∆ with q ⊆ f and div(f ) ≤ k :
We can restrict the analysis to f such that div(f ) = k, since for all other f ∈ ∆ the claim is true by the induction assumption. We split the proof into two parts. First for which div(q) ≤ k − 1 and then for div(q) = k.
First Situation: Consider q ⊂ f , i.e. div(q) ≤ k − 1.
By Lemma B.2 (iii), we have Γ(Γ f (q)) = Γ Γ f (q) (Γ f (q)) = Γ f (q) and hence directly
Since Γ f (q) ⊆ q by definition of a filter and hence div(Γ f (q)) ≤ k −1 the induction assumption applies to the RHS of equation (11), i.e. (P • Γ Γ f (q) )(Γ f (q)) = (P • Γ Γ f (q) ) s (Γ f (q)) which is again identical to (P •Γ f ) s (q) and hence the desired result (P •Γ f ) s (q) = (P •Γ f )(q) is implied directly.
Second Situation: Consider q ⊆ f with div(q) = k A similar construction as in BGSS, but with different reasoning, yields the result. Let q = l∈K α l q l with α l > 0 and K ⊆ {1, ..., m} such that |K| = k. Define the frequency vector q(l) to be the vector in conv({(q j ) j∈K\l }) such that q lies on the line (q(l), q l ). By the minimal attention span property div(Γ q (q)) = div(• {l:q l >0} Γ q (q l )) ≥ 3, i.e. there exist at least three l's (e.g. l = i, j, k) such that Γ q (q l ) = q l = ∅ and hence (P • Γ q )(q l ) = P l = (P • Γ q ) s (q l ). Further, for these l ∈ {i, j, k} we get (P • Γ q ) s (q(l)) = (P • Γ q )(q(l)) by the result of the first situation, since div(q(l)) ≤ k − 1.
Hence we have that (P • Γ q ) s (q), (P • Γ q )(q) ∈ (P l , (P • Γ q )(q(l))) =: L(l), for those three l = i, j, k. Since no three P j are collinear, there are at least two distinct lines L(l), i.e. L(l) = L(n) for at least two distinct l, n ∈ {i, j, k}. Since (P • Γ q ) s (q), (P • Γ q )(q) are both on these distinct lines and these lines need to intersect uniquely, we have (P • Γ q ) s (q) = (P • Γ q )(q). By the ignorance property (P • Γ q )(q) = (P • Γ f )(q) for all f with div(f ) = k, which completes the proof. .
